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Understanding Compressive Adversarial Privacy
Xiao Chen, Peter Kairouz, Ram Rajagopal
Abstract— Designing a data sharing mechanism without sac-
rificing too much privacy can be considered as a game between
data holders and malicious attackers. This paper describes a
compressive adversarial privacy framework that captures the
trade-off between the data privacy and utility. We characterize
the optimal data releasing mechanism through convex optimiza-
tion when assuming that both the data holder and attacker
can only modify the data using linear transformations. We
then build a more realistic data releasing mechanism that can
rely on a nonlinear compression model while the attacker uses
a neural network. We demonstrate in a series of empirical
applications that this framework, consisting of compressive
adversarial privacy, can preserve sensitive information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has progressed dramatically in many real-
life tasks such as classifying image [1], processing natural
language [2], predicting electricity consumption [3], and many
more. These tasks rely on large datasets that are usually
saturated with private information. Data holders who want
to apply machine learning techniques may not be cautious
about what additional information the model can capture from
training data, as long as the primary task can be solved by
some model with high accuracy.
In this paper, we propose a privatization mechanism to
avoid the potential exposure of the sensitive information
while still preserving the necessary utility of the data that
is going to be released. This mechanism largely leverages
the concept of the game-theoretic approach by perturbing the
data and retraining the model iteratively between data holder
and malicious data attacker. Such a data perturbation idea is
highly correlated with feature transformation and selection
of the raw data input that correlated with private labels.
Protecting privacy has been extensively explored in myriad
literature. A popular procedure is to anonymize the identifiable
personal information in datasets (e.g. removing name, social
security number, etc.). Yet anonymization doesn’t provide
good immunity against correlation attacks. A previous study
[4] was able to successfully deanonymize watch histories
in the Netflix Prize, a public recommender system compe-
tition. Another study designed re-identification attacks on
anonymized fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging)
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imaging datasets [5]. On the other hand, the Differential
privacy (DP) [6] has a strong standard of privacy guarantee
and is applicable to many problems beyond database release
[7]. This DP mechanism has been introduced in data privacy
analysis in control and networks [8]–[11]. In particular, [8]
gave a thorough investigation on performing the centralized
and distributed optimization under differential privacy con-
straints. In this line of research, [10] and [11] focused on the
cases of dynamic data perturbations in control systems. [9]
presented a noise adding mechanism to protect the differential
privacy of network topology.
However, training machine learning models with DP
guarantees using randomized data often leads to a significantly
reduced utility and comes with a tremendous hit in sample
complexity [12], [13]. A recent work [14] applied the DP
concept on a deep neural network to demonstrate that a modest
accuracy loss can be obtained at certain worst-case privacy
levels. However, this was still a “context-free” approach that
didn’t leverage the full structure between the data input and
output.
To overcome the aforementioned challenges, we take a new
holistic approach towards enabling private data publishing
with consideration on both privacy and utility. Instead of
adopting worst-case, context-free notions of data privacy
(such as differential privacy), we introduce a context-aware
model of privacy that allows the data holder to cleverly alter
the data where it matters.
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Fig. 1. Data releasing schematic
Our main contributions are listed as follows. First, with the
goal of having a “distribution free” data releasing mechanism
and inspired by general min-max games, we investigate a
typical way of perturbing the data that is the compression
using the data-driven approach. As a second contribution, we
formulate the interaction between data holders and attackers
through convex optimization during the min-max game when
both players apply linear models. A corresponding equilibrium
can be found and used as the optimal strategy for the data
holder to yield the altered data. The third contribution is that
our thorough evaluations of realistic datasets demonstrate
the effectiveness of our compressive adversarial privacy
framework. Finally, we leverage the mutual information to
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validate that sensitive information can be protected from the
privatized data.
The remainder of our paper is arranged as follows. In
section II, we introduce the general adversarial privacy game.
Section III describes the compressive adversarial privacy
game with several cases of realistic data analyses. Section IV
describes the quantification of privacy. Section V concludes
the paper.
II. PRIVACY PRESERVED RELEASING
We propose a general data publishing framework by
incorporating the following game concept. In general there
are two roles in this data releasing game: a data holder and a
data consumer. Among data consumers, some people are good
users who explore the pattern and extract the value of the data.
We merge the good data consumers together with data holders
and address their roles from the data holder perspective, since
good data user are irrelevant in this game. Yet there are people
who also try to learn personal sensitive information from the
data on purpose. We define those malicious users as attackers.
We focus on the data holders and attackers for the following
description of the game.
Consider a dataset D which contains both the original
data X and the associated customers’ sensitive demographic
information Y (e.g. account holder age, house square-footage,
gender, etc.). Thus a sample i has a record (xi, yi) ∈ D. We
denote the function g as a general mechanism for a data
holder to release the data. The released data are denoted as
x˜i for the customer i, which can also be described as x˜i =
g(xi, yi). Notice we don’t release yi to the public because
it’s private information. Generally speaking, X˜ = g(X,Y ).
Let the function h represent the adversarial hypothesis, e.g.
the estimated outcome Yˆ = h(X˜). The attacker would like to
minimize the inference loss on private labels, namely `(Yˆ , Y )
given some loss function `, while the data holder would like
to maximize the attacker’s loss, and in principle, also wants to
preserve the quality of the released data for research purposes.
This data quality is characterized by some distance function
measuring between the original data and the altered data.
Therefore, we formulate a min-max game between the data
holder and the attacker as follows:
max
g∈G
{
min
h∈H
`
(
h
(
g(X,Y )
)
, Y
)}
(1)
s.t. d
(
X, g(X,Y )
) ≤ γ, (2)
where d() could be some distance function, such as Total
Variation (TV), Wasserstein-1, or Frobenius norm, etc. [15],
[16], and γ is a hyper-parameter. The constraint ensures that
the released data will not be distorted too much from the
original data.
This framework allows an attacker to incorporate any loss
functions and design various adversarial inference models,
which typically take the released data to predict the personal
information. Given such a challenge, the data publisher has to
design a good privatization mechanism g and γ to deteriorate
the attacker’s performance, which are also data dependent.
For simplicity, we focus on the supervised learning setting
in this work, but the concept can potentially be extended to
the unsupervised learning.
III. COMPRESSIVE ADVERSARIAL PRIVACY
A typical method to enforce data privacy is data
compression. This method is well studied in [17] from
a theoretical point of differential privacy. In reality, data
compression is used in many applications such as text
messaging and video transmission to protect the privacy. In
this section, we extend the general min-max framework to
a compression approach, namely a compressive adversarial
privacy framework, as shown in Figure 2
Compress
& Re-
construct
Attacker
Yˆ =
h(X˜, Y )
X X˜ `(Yˆ , Y )
Fig. 2. Data compression schematic. X˜ , which has the same dimension
as X , is the reconstructed data that will be released to the public. The
attacker infers the private labels Y by choosing good predictor h, getting
the resulting Yˆ , and minimizing the inference loss denoted as `(Yˆ , Y ).
We focus on two scenarios to illustrate concrete privati-
zation mechanisms. The first one is the linear compression
when an attacker takes a linear model. The second one is
the non-linear compression when an attacker uses a neural
network. We evaluate of both cases based on real data.
A. Linear compression with continuous label
We introduce the case of an attacker who uses a linear
model and the least squared loss function to infer private
information through released data. This case is practical
especially when private labels are continuous and have a linear
relationship with the original data. We denote the original
data matrix X and altered data matirx X˜ ∈ Rn×p, where n
is number of samples, p is number of features, and R is the
set of real numbers. Such a data matrix contains individual
samples xi and x˜i ∈ Rp respectively, where i = 1, . . . , n.
The private-info matrix Y ∈ Rn×d consists of yi ∈ Rd that
each sample i has d types of private labels.
Consider a data holder who has a simple data-releasing
mechanism that applies a linear transformation of X , namely
projecting it down to lower dimensions to protect confidential
information, i.e. Z = XA, where the matrix A ∈ Rp×k, k <
p. Hence, Z ∈ Rn×k. In order to release meaningful data
that still can be utilized by a majority of good users, the data
holder performs a linear operation by multiplying B ∈ Rk×p
on Z and recovers it back to the same dimension as X ,
yielding X˜ = XAB. The attacker fits a linear model to
minimize the mean squared loss that is 1n
∑n
i=1 ‖Θ˜T x˜i −
yi‖22 = 1n
∑n
i=1 ‖Θ˜TBTATxi − yi‖22, where Θ˜ ∈ Rp×d.
Because the domain of Θ˜TBT is contained in ΘT which is
in Rd×k. This attacker’s loss is lower bounded by
min
Θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
‖ΘTATxi − yi‖22, (3)
where Θ ∈ Rk×d. Therefore, when the data holder maximizes
the attacker’s loss, we can maximize this lower bound that
automatically maximizes the minimum loss of the attacker.
The resulting min-max problem can be formulated as
max
A,B
min
Θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
‖ΘTATxi − yi‖22 (4)
s.t. ‖XAB −X‖2F ≤ γ, (5)
where ‖ · ‖F is the Frobenius norm. Given A, we further
simplify the expression by finding the best recovering matrix
Bˆ in place of B as follows (see VI-B for details):
Bˆ = (ATXTXA)−1ATXTX = (ATA)−1AT = A†. (6)
We denote the A† to be the pseudo-inverse of A. The best
predictor Θ for the attacker can be expressed as Θ =
(ATCxxA)
−1ATCxy, where Cxx = 1n
∑n
i=1 xix
T
i , Cxy =
1
n
∑n
i=1 xiy
T
i . Substituting Θ and B, we have the following
problem:
max
A
{
− Tr
(
CTxyA(A
TCxxA)
−1ATCxy
)}
(7)
s.t. ‖XA(ATXTXA)−1ATXTX −X‖2F ≤ γ. (8)
Notice that Cxx = 1nX
TX . By flipping the sign of the
maximization and denoting M = A(ATXTXA)−1AT which
is a positive semidefinite matrix (see the appendix VI-C), we
have the following problem:
min
M
1
n
Tr
(
CTxyXMX
TCxy
)
(9)
s.t. M  0 (10)
‖XMXTX −X‖2F ≤ γ (11)
rank(M) = k. (12)
We put a rank constraint (12) because the dimension A is
p × k, (k < p). This problem can be further relaxed to a
convex optimization by regularizing the nuclear norm of
matrix M as follows:
min
M
1
n
Tr
(
CTxyXMX
TCxy
)
+ β‖M‖∗ (13)
s.t. ‖XMXTX −X‖2F ≤ γ (14)
M  0, (15)
where ‖ · ‖∗ is the nuclear norm of a matrix that heuristically
controls the rank of a matrix. Such a convex relaxation allows
the data publisher to find an optimal solution of M , and
correspondingly yields the appropriate X˜ (see appendix VI-
A). Thus, both players can achieve an equilibrium in this
game. To ensure the problem is feasible, one caveat is that
we cannot pick arbitrarily small γ without considering the
aforementioned rank k. We note that X˜ = XAA† is a low
rank-k approximation of the original data matrix X .
Theorem 1: Suppose a rank-p matrix X consists of the
singular values λ1, . . . , λp. With the best rank-k approxima-
tion X˜k under Frobenius norm, the distortion threshold γ is
at least
∑p
i=k+1 λ
2
i .
We put the proof in appendix VI-F. The theorem reveals
the relationship between setting the distortion tolerance γ
and the rank k. Hence, a simple algorithm (Algorithm 1) is
proposed for the data holder to generate X˜ .
Algorithm 1 Generating X˜ (Linear attacker)
1: Input: dataset (X,Y ) ∈ D, parameter γ, β0, k, η.
2: Output: X˜
3: partition dataset into several batches (X,Y ).
4: for a batch of (X,Y ) ∈ D do
5: kˆ = 0, t = 0
6: while kˆ 6= k do
7: Mt = arg minM{ 1n Tr(CTxyXMXTCxy) +
βt‖M‖∗
s.t. ‖XMXTX − X‖2F ≤ γ} (solving the opti-
mization in equation (13 - 15) with certain values
of γ, βt, k).
8: Ut,Λt ← SV D(Mt) (applying Singular Value
Decomposition on Mt = UtΛtUTt to get matrices
Ut and Λt.)
9: kˆ = ˜rank(Λt). check the rank of the ma-
trix Λ with non trivial eigenvalues. (e.g λj >
ηλmax,where ∀j = 1, . . . , n; η = 0.01.)
10: if kˆ = k then
11: break
12: else if kˆ > k then
13: βt+1 ← βt + βt2
14: else if kˆ < k then
15: βt+1 ← βt − βt4
16: end if
17: t = t+ 1
18: end while
19: X˜ ← XMXTX
20: end for
Remark 1: This approach can be interpreted as releasing a
low dimensional approximation to a set of data, incorporating
the relation between the original data and private labels, while
still maintaining a certain distortion between the released data
and the original data.
We also discovered that a similar scheme can be applied on
compressing original data with additive Gaussian noise. See
Appendix VI-E for details.
B. Case study: Power consumption data
The first experiment of our analysis uses the CER dataset,
which was collected during a smart metering trial conducted
in Ireland by the Irish Commission for Energy Regulation
(CER) [18]. The dataset contains measurements of electricity
consumption gathered from over 4000 households every
30 minutes between July 2009 and December 2010. Each
participating household was asked to fill out a questionnaire
about the households’ socio-economic status, appliances stock,
properties of the dwelling, etc. [19]. To demonstrate our
concepts, we sampled a portion of the customers who has
valid entries of demographic information, e.g. number of
appliances and floor area of the individual house. In the
following experiment, we treat floor area as private data Y .
Throughout the case simulations, we extract the four-week
time series in September 2010. Since the power consumption
(in kilowatts) is recorded every 30 minutes, there are 2 ×
24× 28 = 1344 entries for a single household. To simplify
the input dimension and avoid the over-fitting issue from
raw input, we compute a set of features on the electricity
consumption records of a household. The features then serve
as the input to the prediction model. Table IV lists all 23
features we calculated from electricity consumption data,
which is also used in [19]. We treat these features as X
and normalize them such that they range from 0 to 1. Data
normalization is required in our experiment in that it gets rid
of the scale inconsistency across the different features.
Fig. 3. Display the sampled data. Left panel shows the histogram of Floor
area of each house. Right panel shows the prediction capability of a linear
model that fits on the Floor area
In the linear transformation model, given Y is the private
information, we run algorithm 1 to release X˜ . This procedure
involves solving semidefinite programming, which could be
slow when the dimension of input samples is large. So we
partition the samples into several groups with a reasonable
number of households in each group (e.g. 30 to 40 as long
as the number of households is larger than the number
of features). After running experiments on several rank
conditions of data matrices, we found that lower rank indicates
better privacy (higher prediction error), given in Table I. With
a low rank condition that the data holder maintains, the
attacker can barely (see Table I) predict the private label
Y . We also partitioned the data into 80% for training and
20% for testing. Table I shows the corresponding results with
different ranks of the compression matrix for the testing set.
A batch of released data differs from the original when rank
is 4, 10 and 18. The difference is shown in Figure 4.
TABLE I
METRICS OF LINEAR TRANSFORMED DATA
Rank RMSE R2 distortion
4 6.7e+04 1.61e-08 0.616
10 7.1e+01 2.28e-03 0.081
18 8.7e-01 1.12e-02 0.079
23 3.9e-02 8.01e-01 0
C. Nonlinear compression with categorical variable
Another common type of data has publishable features
X are high-dimensional continuous and the private labels
Y are discrete, for instance, images with some discrete
labels (e.g. gender). Generally speaking, a sample i has
yi ∈ Y = {−1,+1} and xi ∈ Rp where xTi is the ith row
of the data matrix X . The data holder designs a nonlinear
compression mechanism to reduce the classification accuracy
of yi given x˜i, where x˜i = g(xi, yi). We assume the attacker
can use an advanced model, e.g. neural networks, to estimate
the private labels. We further specify that h and g are
functions parametrized by θh and θg . The attacker minimizes
the estimation loss, that is, minθh `(hθh(gθg (X,Y )), Y ). The
data holder designs a compressive function g to maximize the
attacker’s loss as well as maintain a certain distortion γ as
aforementioned in equations (1),(2). This min-max game is
difficult to find its equilibrium point in the context of neural
networks with constraints, because the objective functions
are non-convex with respect to parameters. Therefore, we use
a heuristic way to cast the constrained optimization into a
unconstrained optimization with regularization as follows:
max
θg
{
min
θh
1
n
n∑
i=1
`
(
hθh
(
gθg (xi, yi)
)
, yi
)
(16)
−β(( 1
n
n∑
i=1
‖gθg (xi, yi)− xi‖2)− γ
)2
(17)
+ρmin{0, γ − ( 1
n
n∑
i=1
‖gθg (xi, yi)− xi‖2)}
}
, (18)
where β and ρ are the hyper parameters controlling the iterates
satisfied by the constraints. The distortion is characterized by
the averaged Euclidean norm of the difference in samples. We
propose a simple min-max alternative algorithm (Algorithm
2) to obtain the parameter θg for the function g and yield
the corresponding X˜ . Similar to the idea of the Augmented
Lagrangian method [20], the scale of β and ρ are gradually
increasing as the iteration step increases. The term (18) is
added to ensure the solution strictly satisfies the constraint
mentioned in expression (2). Other alternative approaches
are also proposed in [21]–[23]. Distinguished from those
works, we construct a convex approximation with distortion
constraints that is applied in privacy games.
D. Case study: Images of people
To perform our experiment of the nonlinear compressive
model with a categorical response variable, we use the Groups
of People dataset [24]. The dataset contains 4550 images from
Flicker of human faces with labeled attributes such as age
and gender. These images are 61 × 49 in grayscale pixels
ranging from 0 to 255, with 3500 training and 1050 testing
samples respectively. In this experiment, the images are X
and the label of gender, which is evenly spread in both the
training and testing sets, is Y . We label female or male as 1
or -1. Sampled raw images are shown in Appendix VI-H.
For the data holder to perform nonlinear compression, we
implement a three-layer neural network, which shares the
similar concept of the autoencoder [25]. The first two layers
serve as an encoder. The initial layer has 2989 units that takes
original vectorized images [2989 = 61× 49], followed by a
ReLU activation and batch normalization. We vary the second
layer units from 2048, 512, and 128 for several cases, which
Fig. 4. Difference between altered and original data when rank equals 4, 10, and 18
Algorithm 2 Generating X˜ (Neural Net attacker)
1: Input: dataset D, parameter γ, iteration number T
2: Output: Optimal data publisher parameters θg
3: Initialize θtg and θ
t
h when t = 0
4: for t = 0, ..., T do
5: take minibatch of n samples {x(1), . . . , x(n)} drawn
randomly from D
6: Generate x˜(i) = gθg (x(i), y(i)) for i = 1, . . . , n
7: Compute the parameter θt+1h for the adversary
θt+1h = arg minθh
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(hθh(x˜(i)), y(i))
8: Compute the descent direction ∇θgL(θg, θt+1h ), where
L(θg, θt+1h ) = −
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(hθt+1h
(gθg (x(i), y(i))), y(i))
+β
(
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
‖gθg (x(i), y(i))− x(i)‖22)− γ
)2
+ρmax{0, ( 1
n
n∑
i=1
‖gθg (xi, yi)− xi‖2)− γ}
9: Perform backtracking line search along ∇θgL(θg, θt+1h )
and update θt+1g = θ
t
g − αt∇θgL(θg, θt+1h ), αt > 0
10: Exit if solution converged
11: end for
12: return θt+1g ; X˜ = gθt+1g (X,Y )
are denoted as compression-rank. We define the corresponding
compression-rank rate 0.685, 0.171, and 0.043 to be high,
medium and low respectively1. The last layer, connected with
ReLU activation, has the same dimension as the vectorized
image input that performs the role of a decoder. The attacker
is represented by a 3-layer neural network, comprised of an
initial 2989 units layer, followed by 2048 units layer, and
lastly a two units layer as softmax output. We apply leaky
ReLU activation and batch normalization between each layer.
Before considering adversarial compression, we first
classify reconstructed images with different compression-
rank rates without having a min-max game. This operation
serves two purposes: a) investigating the accuracy of gender
1the compression-rank rate is obtained by number of bottleneck units
divided by input units. e.g. 2048
2989
= 0.685
classification; b) fetching the minimum distortion threshold
γ in the context of mean squared error loss (i.e. min
1
n
∑n
i=1 ‖x˜i − xi‖2 yields the smallest γ). The following
results are evaluated based on the testing set. Figure 5 displays
a sampled image associated with different scenarios. A lower
compression rank rate yields a worse image quality. Table II
shows that compressing images with the high and medium
ranks doesn’t reduce the gender classification accuracy too
much, yielding a relatively low image quality loss. In the
example of high compression-rank, the average distortion per
pixel is 0.0166 ∗ 102 ≈ 1.6% which is not too large.
Fig. 5. A sampled face. Top row: From left to right are an original image,
and then decoded images with high, medium and low compression-rank
rate. Bottom row: From left panel to right panels are the result of the pixel
difference between decoded and raw image projected to 0-255 with high,
medium and low compression-rank rates respectively
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION RESULTS OF GENDER WITH THE RAW DATA UNDER
DIFFERENT COMPRESSION-RANK CASES
compression-rank accuracy(gender) distortion/pixel distortion
raw (2989) 0.692 0 0
high (2048) 0.685 0.0166 0.195
medium (512) 0.664 0.0259 0.304
low (128) 0.627 0.0312 0.365
Utilizing the previous result as a reference, we pick several
proper values of γ to further understand the adversarial privacy
compression. In the high compression-rank case, we test
three scenarios where γ is 0.3, 2 and 4 respectively. We
discover that the encoder-decoder tends to alternate pixels
near eyes, mouths, and rims of hair. A similar patten can
also be observed when we test the low compression-rank
case where γ is 1, 2 and 4. We also notice that the low
compression-rank scenario has a more scattered dotted patten
of black/gray pixels at the large tolerance level, whereas
the high compression-rank case has more concentrated black
pixels, as shown in Figure 6. We believe the reason is that
the data holder always adjusts the pixels that are highly
correlated with gender. Since the high compression-rank
encoder-decoder preserves more information than the low
compression-rank one, it’s much easier for the data holder to
alter the target pixel features within limited total distortion.
The privatized images generated through min-max training
indeed yield lower prediction accuracy of gender than the
original encoded-decoded images. Table III depicts the gender
classification results indicating that it is harder to predict
gender with increased distortion. The table also reveals
that higher compression rank performs better in terms of
decreasing the accuracy if the distortion is sufficiently large.
TABLE III
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF GENDER WITH THE DATA RELEASED
UNDER ADVERSARIAL PRIVACY
compression-rank γ = 0.3 γ = 1 γ = 2 γ = 4
high (2048) 0.628 0.600 0.573 0.486
medium (512)1 0.607 0.594 0.512
low (128) 0.602 0.585 0.521
1 γ = 0.3 is unattainable, since the compression rank is
small enough so that the minimum reconstruction loss (Mean
Squared Error) already reachs to the 0.3.
Fig. 6. A sampled image with different compression rank and distortion
tolerance γ. Top left: From left to right are visual output when γ equals
0.3, 2, 4 in the high compression-rank case. Top right: From left to right,
these images show the difference between output images and raw images
for corresponding γ value in the high compression-rank case. Bottom left:
From left to right are visual output when γ equals 1, 2, 4 in the low
compression-rank case. Bottom right: From left to right are difference
between output images and raw images for corresponding γ value in the
low compression-rank case.
IV. PRIVACY GUARANTEE
Our previous experiments show that a (local) equilibrium
can be achieved through this min-max game approach. While
we cannot preclude that there may be some other equilibria in
the context of a neural network. Thus, a quantifiable metric
is needed to give privacy guarantee between sensitive data
and altered data.
In this section we introduce the empirical mutual-
information concept to quantify the privatization quality of
this min-max game approach, i.e. measuring the correlation
between the sensitive response data and the released feature
data pre- and post-privatization. Mutual information (MI) [26]
is a well established tool that has been widely adopted to
quantify the correlation between the two streams of data by
a non-negative scalar [27]. From the data driven perspective,
we have the empirical MI Iˆ(X;Y ) = Hˆ(X) − Hˆ(X|Y ),
where Hˆ characterizes the empirical entropy. This empirical
entropy can be calculated using the classical nearest k-th
neighbor method [28].
Continuous response label: Given that Y is continuous,
the mutual information can be expressed as Iˆ(X;Y ) =
Hˆ(X) + Hˆ(Y ) − Hˆ(X,Y ), where Hˆ(X), Hˆ(Y ) can be
obtained directly from method in [28], given samples xi, yi.
The joint empirical entropy is calculated by concatenating
each xi and yi together as one sample and using the nearest
neighbor entropy estimation again.
Categorical response label: For the discrete response
Y ∈ {−1,+1}, we have the mutual information Iˆ(X;Y ) =
Hˆ(X) − Hˆ(X|Y ) = Hˆ(X) − (p(Y = −1)Hˆ(X|Y =
−1) + p(Y = 1)Hˆ(X|Y = 1)), where p(Y = ±1) can
be approximated by the sample frequency in the dataset, and
Hˆ(X|Y = ±1) can be obtained by the aforementioned k-th
nearest neighbor method with partitioned samples according
to the value of Y .
For the experiment of the continuous response variable,
we first calculate the empirical MI between the power con-
sumption statistics and floor areas. The original MI between
power usage statistics data and floor area is Iˆ(X;Y ) = 2.150.
The resulting MI between altered power usage data and floor
areas, which is denoted by Iˆ(X˜;Y ), are 0.995, 0.494, and
0.216 when the rank of compression matrices are 18, 10,
and 4. For the categorical response variable experiment, the
empirical MI between the images data and gender data is
obtained as follows. The original MI between raw images
X and gender label Y is Iˆ(X;Y ) = 0.249. When we pick
high compression-rank with γ = 0.3, 1, 2 and 4, the Iˆ(X˜;Y )
are 0.217, 0.170, 0.105, and 0.012. The medium compression-
rank yields Iˆ(X˜;Y ) to be 0.179, 0.112, and 0.014 for γ =
1, 2, and 4 respectively. In the low compression rank case,
Iˆ(X˜;Y ) are 0.174, 0.101, and 0.017 with the aforementioned
γ. We notice the empirical MI indeed decreases as the
distortion increases. Due to the challenge of high dimensional
data, we apply the principal component analysis to project
the X˜ down to 16 dimensions and find the approximate
Iˆ(X˜;Y ). This is an alternative attempt to demonstrate the
effectiveness of using our framework. The changes of mutual
information value show the privacy guarantee between the
released data and sensitive labels under various distortion
conditions. Yet we believe a more advanced architecture of
the neural network can be applied to extract the embeddings
of semantic features, resulting a better estimates of empirical
mutual information. We will explore this potential direction
in our future research.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence require a
huge amount of data to support the learning quality of various
models. Yet the risk of data privacy is often overlooked in the
current data sharing processes. The recent news of data leak-
age by Facebook shows that privacy risk could significantly
impact some issues in politics. Therefore, securely designing a
good data privatization mechanism is important in the context
of utilizing machine learning models. By thorough evaluations,
our new min-max adversarial compressive privacy framework
provide an effective and robust approach to protect private
information. We leverage the data-driven approach without
posing assumptions on data distribution. It’s crucial during
practical implementation, since the real data is often more
complicated than a simple characterization of a parametric
probability distribution. Along this line of research, many
interesting extensions can be built on our framework to create
a robust privacy protector for data holders.
VI. APPENDIX
A. Casting linear problem
Consider the following problem
min
B
‖XAB −X‖2F , (19)
where matrix X is n× p, matrix A is p× k, and matrix B
is k × p. We give a brief minimizer derivation as follows:
‖XAB −X‖2F = Tr
(
(XAB −X)(XAB −X)T
)
= Tr
(
XABBTATXT − 2XABXT +XXT
)
.
The derivative of the first term with respect to B is
∂
∂B
Tr(XABBTATXT ) =
∂
∂B
Tr(BBTATXTXA)
= (ATXTXA)B + (ATXTXA)TB = 2(ATXTXA)B.
The derivative of the second term with respect to B is
∂
∂B
Tr(2XABXT ) = 2
∂
∂B
Tr(BXTXA) = 2(XTXA)T
Thus, we set the derivative equals zero and obtain the
minimizer B as follows:
∂
∂B
Tr
(
XABBTATXT − 2XABXT +XXT
)
(20)
= 2(ATXTXA)B − 2(XTXA)T , 0 (21)
=⇒ (ATXTXA)B = ATXTX (22)
=⇒ B = (ATXTXA)−1ATXTX. (23)
Now we design the X˜ such that
X˜ = XAB = XA (ATXTXA)−1ATXTX︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(24)
= X A(ATXTXA)−1AT︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
XTX. (25)
Instead of explicitly designing a low rank matrix A , we
solve an alternative equivalent problem of determining a low
rank matrix M to compress the data.
B. Recovering Linear Operation
Claim: B is pseudoinverse of A, i.e. B = (ATA)−1AT =
A†.
Proof: We apply Singular Value Decomposition (aka
SVD, which is similar to PCA) on data matrix X = USV T .
U is n× k, S is k × k, V is p× k. We have
B = (ATXTXA)−1ATXTX
=
(
AT (USV T )T (USV T )A
)−1
AT (USV T )T (USV T )
= (ATV SUTUSV TA)−1ATV SUTUSV T
= (ATV S UTU︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
SV TA)−1ATV S UTU︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
SV T
= (ATV S2V TA)−1ATV S2V T
= (S2ATV︸ ︷︷ ︸
swapped
V TA)−1 S2ATV︸ ︷︷ ︸
swapped
V T
= (S2AT V V T︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
A)−1S2AT V V T︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
= (S2ATA)−1S2AT = (ATA)−1AT .
C. Proof of positive semidefinite property of a matrix
Claim: M = A(ATXTXA)−1AT is Positive Semidefinite.
Proof: show ATXTXA is positive semidefinite. Since A ∈
Rp×k, X ∈ Rn×p, for any vector v ∈ Rk, we have
vTATXTXAv = (XAv)T (XAv) = ‖XAv‖22 ≥ 0.
Therefore, we can apply Signaler Value Decomposition
on (ATXTXA), we get (ATXTXA) = V SV T , where
S = diag(σ1, σ2, ..., σk). The resulting (ATXTXA)−1 can
be expressed as (ATXTXA)−1 = V (S−1)V T where
S−1 = diag(1/σ1, 1/σ2, ..., 1/σk). Because all σ are posi-
tive, we denote δ2i =
1
σi
. Hence ∆ = diag(δ1, ..., δk). And
M = AV∆∆TV TAT . (26)
For any v ∈ Rp, we have
vTMv = vT (∆TV TAT )T∆TV TAT v (27)
= ‖∆TV TAT v‖22 ≥ 0. (28)
Thus M is positive semidefinite.
D. Convexity of a re-parameterized problem
Claim: The following optimization is convex:
min
M
Tr
(
CTxyXMX
TCxy
)
+ β‖M‖∗ (29)
s.t. ‖XMXTX −X‖2F ≤ γ. (30)
Proof: It is easy to see that the first term
Tr
(
CTxyXMX
TCxy
)
is convex, since M is positive semidef-
inite, trace operator is linear with respect to M . The second
term and third term are also convex. For any norm, given
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and two matrices A,B, we have
‖αA+ (1− α)B‖ ≤ ‖αA‖+ ‖(1− α)B‖ = α‖A‖+ (1− α)‖B‖
Hence Frobenius norm and Nuclear norm are specific forms
of norm that is convex with respect to M . The first term in
the objective is just linear in M . Thus, the problem is convex.
E. Deriving linear compression with noise
Consider the case ε ∼ N (0,Σ). We have the min-max
game as follows
max
A,B,Σ
min
Θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
ε∼Pε
‖ΘT (ATxi + ε)− yi‖22 (31)
− γ‖XAB −X‖2F (32)
For attacker, we have the following minimization problem
min
Θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
ε∼Pε
‖ΘT (ATxi + ε)− yi‖22 (33)
= min
Θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
(ATxi + εi)
TΘΘT (ATxi + εi) (34)
− 2(ATxi + εi)TΘyi + yiyTi
)
(35)
We first find the minimizer Θ for the attacker. By taking the
derivative over Θ, we have
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
ATxix
T
i A+ εiε
T
i
)
Θ = AT
1
n
n∑
i=1
xiy
T
i (36)
Θ = (ATXTXA+ Σ)−1ATCxy (37)
Also we also find the best recover matrix B by considering
the following relation X˜ = XA+ ε
Eε∼Pε‖X˜ −X‖2F (38)
= Tr
(
(XAB + εB −X)(XAB + εB −X)T
)
(39)
= Tr(XABBTATXT +BΣBT − 2XABXT ) (40)
Taking the derivative over B and set it equals 0, we have
B = (ATXTXA+ Σ)−1ATXTX . Hence the data holder’s
maximization can be casted into
min
A,Σ
Tr
(
CTxyA(A
TXTXA+ Σ)−1ATCxy
)
(41)
+ ‖XA(ATXTXA+ Σ)−1ATXTX −X‖2F (42)
It is not difficult to discover that A(ATXTXA+ Σ)−1AT is
also positive semidefinite. Thus the problem can be relaxed
to convex optimization.
F. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: Denote X =
∑p
i=1 λiuiv
T
i , where λi
is singular value, ui, vi are corresponding left and
right singular vectors. The best rank-k approximation
X˜k =
∑k
i=1 λiuiv
T
i is achieved by SVD in Frobe-
nius norm by Eckart-Young theorem [29]. Then ‖X −
X˜k‖2F = Tr
(
(
∑p
i=k+1 λiuiv
T
i )(
∑p
i=k+1 λiuiv
T
i )
T
)
=
Tr(
∑p
i=k+1 λ
2
i ) =
∑p
i=k+1 λ
2
i
G. Features extracted from power data
Features for power consumptions are displayed in Table IV.
H. Images
Original people images are shown in Figure 7
TABLE IV
FEATURES EXTRACTED OUT OF POWER CONSUMPTIONS
Index Description
1 Week total mean
2 Weekday total mean
3 Weekend total mean
4 Day (6am - 10pm) total mean
5 Evening (6pm - 10pm) total mean
6 Morning (6am - 10am) total mean
7 Noon (10am - 2pm) total mean
8 Night (1am - 5am) total mean
9 Week max power
10 Week min power
11 ratio of Mean over Max
12 ratio of Min over Mean
13 ratio of Morning over Noon
14 ratio of Noon over Day
15 ratio of Night over Day
16 ratio of Weekday over Weekend
17 proportion of time with Pt > 0.5kw
18 proportion of time with Pt > 1kw
19 proportion of time with Pt > 2kw
20 sample variance of Pt
21 sum of difference |Pt − Pt−1|
22 sample cross correlation of subsequent days
23 number of counts that |Pt − Pt−1| > 0.2kw
Fig. 7. The sampled images with the dimension of 61× 49 for each one.
I. Low rank linear transformation
Singular value matrices for a batch of samples with the low
rank transformation are shown in Figure 8. And the raw and
altered power consumption features are shown in Figure 9
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